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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

************
P. JAMES COLE¥AN,
Appellant,
Case Nos.

VS.

16666 & 16926

R. EARL DILLl1AN,
AtJpellee.

******** ** * * *
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

*************
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
This is an appeal from the decision of the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein the nistrict Court
denied the appellant Coleman specific performance of an oral
contract for the purchase of land and granted the Appellee
restitution of the premises.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

January 28 or 29 of 1975, the appellant moved into

a home owned by the appellee located at 2670 Creek Road, Salt
Lake County, Utah.

The appellant testified that he moved into

the house pursuant to an oral agreement for the purchase of the
home for the sum of $36,000.

He testified that the appellee

had previously sold the home and the sale had fallen through
and that appellant was merely to take over the position of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

previous buyer and to keep the payments current of $303.29
per month (Tr. 6-7).

The appellee testified that the appellar

was occupying the home pursuant to an oral rental agreement
(Tr. 110), wherein the rent to be paid was $303.29 per month.
After moving into the home the appellant made several improvements on the home, such as installing four windows; plant
ing a lawn; replacing a yard which had been eroded by a flash
flood (R. 87).

Additionally, the appellant made improvements

on the home such as repairs on the heater, placed a new motor
on the furnace, and also had to have the sewer cleaned out
eight or nine times (Tr. 88-89).

At no time did the appellant

ever request reimbursement from the appellee for the improvements or the repairs (Tr. 88, 89).
After moving into the home the appellant made several pay·
ments to the appellee, although the same were sporatic and not
the precise amount of the agreed consideration.
The appellant and appellee engaged in several joint ventur
wherein the appellant was working for the appellee (Tr. 86, 11

121).

Some of the compensation that the appellant would recei

for such work, according to his testimony, went to apply on tr
payment for the home.

Additionally, and it is undisputed, thi

the appellant made several payments to the appellee, some of
which contained the words "house payment" thereon (Tr. 79-80,

Ex. P. 1-2).
Although there is a dispute as to whether the appellant wi
occupying the premises pursuant to a purchase or rental contri
the following facts are undisputed:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lrrunediately prior to the appellants occupying the premises
the appellee had the premises listed for sale (Tr. 180-181).
Appellant made payments upon the premises and some of those
payments reflected the words "house payment" (Tr. 79-80, Ex. P.

1-2).
A commitment for title insurance was obtained (Tr. 96-97,
Ex. P. 13).
The appellant applied for a loan to pay the full purchase
price to the appellant (Tr. 93, 97, 164-169).
The appellant offered to pay off the appellee as soon as
the judgments and liens were cleared up so that he could obtain
the loan.
The appellant instituted a lawsuit for specific performance
to require the appellee to convey the property to himself (R.

2-3).
The appellee then instituted an action for wrongful detainer
seeking eviction of the appellant (R. 1-2, 4 Sup. Ct. 4f16666).
Appellee then moved to consolidate (R. 9-10).

Thereafter,

the parties stipulated that two actions "involved connnon questions of law and fact and should be consolidated for the purpose
of trial" (R. 12, Sup. Ct. #16666) and the District Court ordered
the actions consolidated for the trial (R. 13, Sup. Ct. #16666).
Appellant requested a jury trial and the jury fee was paid
(Tr. 11).

The appellee objected to the jury demand (Tr. 44).

At the time of trial without motion on the part of either
party, the court separated the two cases and proceeded to try
only the case for specific performance without a jury and left
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the other case and issues to be tried at a later date with a
jury.
The court found, without a jury "the facts do not warrant
finding that there was part performance and which would take

t

alleged oral contract out of the effect of the statute of frat
(Tr. 59-60).

The court further found that the attempt to obta

financing and to pay off the balance of the purchase price, as
suming an oral contract for sale was no justification for the
appellant's failure to make the monthly payments thereafter (T
60).

POINT I
THE TENDER OF THE FULL PURCHASE PRICE TO THE APPELLEE
RELIEVES THE APPELLANT FROM MAKING THE FURTHER MONTHLY
PAYMENTS.
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, there was a <lisp
as to whether the appellant was occupying the premises in ques
pursuant to an oral purchase agreement or an oral rental contr
That question was never answered by the court.

It should be

noted that the District Court found there was not sufficient p
performance to take an oral contract out of the statute of fra
and, further, that the failure to make the monthly payments ev
after a tender of the full purchase price did not relieve the
appellant from a breach, there was never a finding as to wheth
or not there was a contract in existence.

This is, presumably

because the District Court knew that such a question would pro
perly be left for a jury and, therefore, did not decide the qu
tion for fear of denying the appellant his right to

a.

jury tri

This point will be more thorettghly discussed in later portion
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this brief.

However, if there was such a contract, it is the

appellant's position that the attempt to obtain a loan to pay
off the full purchase price and the frustration thereof by the
appellee would excuse his remaining performance for the monthly
payments.
As noted previously, the appellant testified that he was
occupying the premises pursuant to an oral purchase contract for
$36,000 with monthly payments of $303.29.

It is further undis-

puted that many of the payments were made, although some were
not, and the sum of the payments contained the words "house
payment" thereon.

It is further undisputed that improvements

were made on the house and that repairs were made and that no
reimbursement was requested from the appellee.

Then, and it is

further undisputed, that the appellant attempted to obtain a
loan to pay off the balance of the purchase price.

It is further

undisputed that the loan could not be obtained because the appellee had so many liens and judgments against the property that
the lending institution would not make the loan.

The appellant

testified:
"I tol<l Mr. Dillman I was going to go ahead and get
the loan and pay the house off. So I proceeded to
First Security State Bank.
Question: During that conversation with Mr. Dillman,
did he give you anything to help you in getting the
loan?
Answer: At that time, he did not give me anything.
But he had given me Cormnonwealth Title Report prior
to that, so that I could go at my convenience and
get the loan. (Tr. 24-25)
Question: Mr. Coleman, after obtaining Exhibit P13, you indicated you, some time later, applied for
a loan.
Answer:

Yes.
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Question: I believe that your testimony was that
you applied with First Security State Bank.
Answer:

Yes.

Question: ~vith whom did you apply =or First Security State Bank, any particular officer?
Answer:
20-26)

With a loan officer, Gloria Oldham. (Tr.

Question: Then after, did you have further dealings with First Security State Bank.
Answer: Only that I called up and said that the
title was clouded and we would have to wait. Mr.
Dillman was going to clear title the property for
me.
Gloria Oldham from First Security State Bank testified:
Question: In connection with your employment (First
Security State Bank) there, have you had occassion
to meet Mr. Jim Coleman?
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:

Yes, I have.
What occassion did you have to meet him?
He applied for a loan.
What type of loan was it?
The conventional home loan.
Was the property mentioned?
Yes.
What was the property?
2670 Creek Road.

(Tr. 93-94)

After the loan had been declined because the title

was

clouded, appellant made no further monthly payments to the ap·
pellee.

The District Court found that such constituted a brea

of the agreement between the parties and that the appellant wa
not excused from the monthly payments merely because he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~

able to obtain a loan because the title of the property was
clouded.
There is no question that in a purchase of real estate,
the seller has the obligation to deliver clear title.

If his

failure so to do prevents the purchaser from obtaining the necessary loan to pay off the balance due and owing on the purchase price, it is the appellant's contention that such breach
excuses the purchaser from further performance.
sition is Hornbook law.

Such a propo-

As stated in Am. Jur. on contracts

(17 Am. Jur. 2d 899 Sec. 442):
"It is a necessary implication that every contract
with promises or covenants binding each party that
neither will interfere to prevent performance by
the other, and a contracting party whose performance
of his promises is prevented by the adverse party
is not obligated to perform . . . . If the non-existence, either of something which is a substantial
subject matter of the contract or of some condition
or particular state of things which is of the substance of the contract, it is attributal to some
breach of contract or of duty on the part of one
party and prevents the other party from performing
his contract, such other party has a right of action
on the contract notwithstanding such non-performance."
Therefore, the failure to deliver clear title, which would
allow the appellant to obtain a loan to pay off the appellee constitutes a breach on the part of the appellee which prevented
the appellant from performing, and appellant's non-performance
does not prevent him from maintaining the action for strict performance as prayed for in the complaint.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT A JURY
TRIAL.

-7-
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This case involves a consolidation of two actions.

The

first action was commenced by the appellant to compel specifii
performance of an oral contract for the purchase of land.

Ap

pellee filed a civil action seeking to evict the appellant e
for unlawful detainer.

1

As stated in the Statement of Facts,·

two actions were consolidated upon motion of the appellee and
stipulation of the appellant and a jury trial was requested (:
12-13, Sup. Ct. #16666).

The jury fee was paid and then the

appellee objected to the jury trial (Tr. 44).

The court stati

"We have had a discussion in chambers not on the
record. Mr. Leedy has made a motion that there be
a jury trial. He also, in Civil No. 78-3718, a
long time ago and timely, made a demand for jury
-- trial. Mr. Eckersley made a demand to strike the
jury, claiming Mr. Coleman does not have his right
on the claim, that it is a contract and it is taken
out from under the statute of frauds by the doctrine of part performance and that that is an equitable matter and therefore, he is not entitled
to a jury trial. Counsel discussed the matter
with me in chambers and it is my opinion that on
those issues, it is an equitable matter and am denying the jury trial and the matter will proceed to
court . . . . .
In effect, these cases won't be consolidated.
We're going to try Mr. Coleman's case first, but
that will be non-jury." (Tr. 3-4)
It is the appellant's position that once the cases were
consolidated and the jury demand made, that the court erred ir
separating the two cases and trying some of the issues withou'.
a jury although no request for separation was made. C.F. Will<
M. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P. 2d 607 (Utah 1978).
It is unique in this case that there has never been a fine
that there was not an oral contract for the purchase or salec
the land in question.

Obviously, such a finding would be a fi

tual issues for the jury.
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NOT PART PERFOR.1'1ANCE.
There is no question that specific performance is a proper
remedy for a breach of an oral contract for the purchase of
land.

Rich v. McGovern, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 1976); Sandberg

v. Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978); Summary of Utah Real
Property Law, Ch. VIII, p. 259; Christensen v. Christensen, 9
UT 2d 102, 105, 339 P. 2d 101, 103 (1959); Brinton v. Vancott,
8 Utah 480, 33 Pac. 218 (1893); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d
40, 269 P. 2d 278 (1954); Lynch v. Coriglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 Pac.
983 (1898); In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595
(1953); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305
P. 2d 480 (1956); Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel Gold Min.
_ Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P. 2d 1094 (1943); Adams v. Taylor, 391
P. 2d 837 (Utah 1964); 9 Utah Law Rev. 91, 100-101; Brady v.
Fausett, 546 P. 2d 246 (Utah 1976); Utah Code Ann., 25-5-8, 1953.
Section 25-5-8, Utah Code Ann. provides:
"Nothing in this chapter contained should be construed to abridge the powers of the courts to compel
the specific performance of agreements in case of
part performance thereof."
There is no question that the appellant moved into possession
of the premises; that he made payments thereon; that he made repairs thereon, and improvement thereon.

If there was a contract

for the purchase of land, these facts would certainly show part
performance.

The issue is not whether there was substantial per-

formance but whether or not a contract for the purchase of the
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property in question existed the court erred in finding that
the above facts do not constitute part performance.
Respectfully submitted,

Richard J. Leedy
Attorney for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

~~day

of July, 1980,

I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Ap?ellant to
M. David Eckersley, 500 Ten West Broadway Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84101.
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